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Signaling and Simulations in Sociolinguistics
Abstract
Along with game theory, the emerging science of networks has given us a framework for analyzing social
systems plausible to both intuition and implementation. As an interaction structure in computer simulation
models, social networks provide a way to envision phenomena like information spread, dialect formation, and
language change in a more robust way. In this sense a multitude of sociolinguistic issues are potential 'objects
of study' for a) being delineated with methods from game theory and/or network theory and b) being
analyzed by simulations of multi-agent interactions, with the goal of exploring the interplay between social
factors and linguistic usage. In this sense we i) consider network structure as an important social variable; ii)
depict the usage of computer simulations as an appropriate, valid, and powerful technique to analyze
sociolinguistic issues; and iii) put a premium on game theory as a method for adequately modeling
communicative behavior, with the conclusion that network theory & game theory in simulation models
represents a powerful combination for the analysis of sociolinguistic phenomena. This makes it a crucial
supplement towards enhancing current sociolinguistic experimentation and theories.
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1 Introduction
Humans interact in structured populations, primarily through language. This is nothing surprising.
Surprising, however, are now the means to analyze these interactions as never before. Along with
game theory, the emerging science of networks has given us a framework for analyzing social sys-
tems plausible to both intuition and implementation. Social networks in computer simulations pro-
vide a way to envision phenomena like information spread, dialect formation, and language change
in a more robust way. With these tools, a multitude of sociolinguistic issues are potential ’objects
of study’ for a) being delineated with methods from game theory and/or network theory and b)
being analyzed by simulations of multi-agent interactions, with the goal of exploring the interplay
between social factors and linguistic usage. In this paper, we i) highlight network structure as an
important social variable; ii) depict the usage of computer simulations as an appropriate, valid, and
powerful technique to analyze sociolinguistic issues; and iii) emphasize game theory’s potential as
a method for adequately modeling communicative behavior. We conclude that network theory &
game theory in simulation models represent a powerful combination for the analysis of sociolinguis-
tic phenomena. This makes them a crucial supplement towards enhancing current sociolinguistic
experimentation and theories.
The importance of social networks in sociolinguistics has been shown in a number of empirical
sociolinguistic studies. For instance, Milroy (1980) and Eckert (2000) examined the network struc-
ture of small communities, focusing on the relation between individuals’ social network properties
and their linguistic performance. Furthermore Labov (2001) and de Bot and Stoessel (2002) con-
sidered social networks as determining factors in language change, contact, maintenance and shift.
In particular, towards analyzing and constructing a theory about the origins and paths of language
change, network structures should be reconsidered as an important factor, as Fagyal et al. (2010a)
pointed out: ”...network studies in sociolinguistics can provide a starting point for theoretical models
of social interactions underlying the spread of novel linguistic variants.”
Let us first examine why we should use computer simulations in addition to empirical studies.
As Labov (1972b) once pointed out: ”the researcher can see the product of change, but not the
process.” Simulations emulating reality give us the possibility to observe not only the resulting
patterns but to also monitor the processes themselves by simultaneously controlling the experimental
environment. Thus we have a transition from a mere thought experiment to something that produces
quantifiable data on the way that communication progresses in a social structure. This aim is evoked
in Nettle (1999b), saying that ”A simulation, however rudimentary, is thus an improvement over a
merely verbal argument, in deciding what general conditions must obtain for languages to evolve in
the way that they do.” Further, the enormous complexity of human networks and the huge amount
of time in which language change takes place can complicate rigorous empirical studies. ”Computer
models can provide an efficient tool to consider large-scale networks with different structures and
discuss the long-term effect on individuals’ learning and interaction on language change.”, as Ke
et al. (2008) pointed out.
Given the appeal of simulations, how should we construct them? For example, how do agents
interact and influence each other? In what kind of structure are they arranged? Game theory of-
fers multiple possibilities to deal with these and further questions. In this respect, when we want
to analyze language use in a more concrete way in terms of how it happens, namely by consid-
ering the communicative act itself, game-theoretic methods have appeal as a recently well-vetted
techniques to model communication. This is for a simple reason: the success of a communicative
act depends on both participants, speaker and addressee. In this sense ”language use satisfies the
abstract characteristics of a game in the sense of game theory.” (Benz et al., 2010).
With this article we want to give an overview of different research directions considering the
application of network theory, computer simulations, and/or game theory in sociolinguistics and fi-
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nally present some work combining the approaches and methods from these fields. This article is
structured as follows: Section 2 will give an overview of empirical sociolinguistic studies dealing
with network structure as a variable driving linguistic change and variation, introducing some basic
notions of network theory along the way. Section 3 will present studies applying computer sim-
ulations to analyze effects and dependencies in language change. Section 4 will give an informal
definition of the game-theoretical model signaling game that allows for modeling i) communication
situation between agents and ii) in a long-term sense communicative behavior of agents. In Section
5 we present two studies of applying signaling games on social network structures and simulat-
ing communicative behavior to analyze specific sociolinguistic phenomena. Finally Section 6 will
give an outlook for possible future applications for combining game theory, network theory, and
simulations for sociolinguistic purposes.
2 Social Networks
Language is necessarily a social phenomenon, as it emerges as a result of repeated interactions be-
tween speakers. Its only constants seem to be variation and change, and these both drive and are
driven by social variables. To that end, understanding social networks is indispensable to sociolin-
guists.
2.1 The Role of Networks in Sociolinguistics
Early work in network-centric sociolinguistic studies focused on the links between the strength of
network ties and the resulting linguistic data. We detail some of that here, along with the research
that contributes to a more nuanced view of embedding as a social variable.
As an example, Ke et al. (2008) simulated language change over a variety of networks, and their
methods were motivated by the gravity social networks hold as ”determining factors in language
change, contact, maintenance and shift (c.f. Labov, 2001; de Bot and Stoessel, 2002)”. The natural
starting point of many sociolinguistic studies has been connecting the dots between social variables
and performance in small communities, and empirical studies of social networks often examine in
detail these networks, focusing on the relation between individuals’ social network properties and
their linguistic performance (c.f. Milroy, 1980). Results include the findings that working class
communities often have close-knit (e.g., high-density and multiplex) social networks in common.
Further, studies have quantitatively shown that individuals’ linguistic behaviors are highly correlated
with their degrees of integration into the network; e.g., the more integrated an individual is, the less
variation (s)he has, and the better (s)he conforms to the speech norm of the community (c.f. Milroy
and Margrain, 1980).
Fagyal et al. (2010a) give several examples of a non-trivial intersection between network prop-
erties and sociolinguistics patterns. They cite Labov’s work in Harlem (Labov, 1972a) that shows
greater network centrality correlated with greater social and linguistic influence. Given that networks
have multiple ways of measuring a node’s centrality, a more nuanced appreciation of these data can
now be accomplished. Similarly, social network studies in Belfast (Milroy and Milroy, 1978, 1985)
show that leaders and their cohorts were shown to be agents of stability and local speech patterns.
Furthermore these studies revealed that people with weak ties act as conduits for innovation: ”Weak
ties provide people with access to information and resources beyond those available in their own so-
cial circle” (Granovetter, 1983). Further, the heterogeneity of networks discussed by Eckert (2000)
points to the need to better understand the details of network topology and its ability to mo del
speaker interaction.
Speakers display remarkable, yet regular, patterns of performance based on their social situa-
tions. The inherent links between structure and performance found in these studies not only make
them potential springboards for constructing simulations, but they also highlight the presence of
strategic interaction, the central concern of the game-theoretic sections to come.
Like Ke et al. (2008) point out: ”In fact, social networks have created a paradox in the study of
language change: although intuitively one would think that social networks should be an important
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factor in determining language change, very few empirical data have been able to show the effect of
social networks quantitatively over long periods of time.” And further on: ”This gap can be filled
by computer simulations which provides a convenient platform to systematically study the effect of
social networks under controlled conditions (Gong, 2007; Parisi and Mirolli, 2007).”
2.2 Social Networks and their Properties
Recent studies on large-scale complex networks in the real world (Barabási, 2002) reveal that most
sparsely connected networks are neither regular nor random. Two important features have been
discovered in these networks: small-world (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and scale-free (Barabási and
Réka, 1999). The salient properties of such small-world or scale-free networks are a low average
path length and a high clustering (both defined below). Furthermore the scale-free network reveals
the presence of highly-connected hubs. These properties often emerge as a result of preferential
attachment (e.g., friendships). Understanding these properties and their impact on social interaction
can be aided by combining the efficiency of abstraction and the computational heft of simulations.
In general, network properties fall into two categories: node properties and connective proper-
ties. Orthogonal to this categorization is the consideration of structural vs. strategic characteristics.
Game theory will provide our canvas for the strategic agent (node) and relationship (link) properties
in the later sections, so we now turn to the structural terms and give some basic notions for node and
connective properties.
One essential property of a node is its centrality. The notion of network centrality seems intu-
itive, but there are many subtle ways of computing it. Given a node in a network, we can measure its
degree centrality (number of neighbors), closeness centrality (average shortest distance to all other
nodes) or betweenness centrality (percentage of connecting paths it occupies). Nodes with high val-
ues in one dimension might not share the same ranking in others, as we could think of a principal
with twenty teachers, each teaching a class of thirty students, a fraction of whom are friends. Fur-
thermore the node property individual clustering (the proportion of neighbors pairs being directly
connected to each other) expresses the strength of embeddedness into the local structure.
Further, networks and their subsets have connective properties like density (ratio of links to
nodes), clustering and transitivity (ratio of fully connected triads). While a high density value of
a (sub-)network depicts a dense global structure, a high clustering or transitivity value connotes a
dense local structure. Furthermore the average path length of a (sub-)network denotes the length of
a shortest path between two nodes averaged over all pairs of nodes in the (sub-)network.
In addition, we can see that the frequencies of speaker interactions can vary across communities,
and thus we can think of each link encoding either a relationship or a series of verbal transmissions.
These notions, and others for which we lack space, give us a richer view of the structure of social
interaction.
3 Simulating Language Change on Social Network Structures
Just as preliminary social data collection can inform the sociolinguist before a study, so can simula-
tions serve as a supplement for testing the impact of social variables on an agent-based speaker
network, serving to fill in potential gaps between network studies and understanding the larger
speech community (Labov, 2001). One of the first sets of studies using simulations on a social
structure to analyze language change, Nettle (1999a,b) abstracts from specific linguistic phenomena
and considers a linguistic norm as an instance of a more general construct, a so-called linguistic item
(Hudson, 1996): an isolated element of phonological and grammatical structure, e.g., a phoneme, a
words, a word orders structure, et cetera. In Nettle’s sense a linguistic item is a cultural trait (c.f.
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985) passed among generations and is
possibly changed over time by modification or even replacement through a competin g item, insti-
gated through e.g., imperfect learning or language contact.1
1This distinction is e.g., made by Labov (2007), who calls it Transmission and Diffusion of linguistic change.
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An essential question in language change is how new linguistic items can spread and possibly
replace old ones. This is subject to the threshold problem: in cultural evolution a language learner
samples from a fairly large number of people expected to use established linguistic items. The
replacement of a new item is therefore quite unlikely, if not impossible, by considering that one
plausible learning algorithm should lead to the adoption to the most common item and that the new
item might be used among a minority (c.f. Sapir, 1921; Keller, 1994). Nettle (1999b) points out that
”New mutants can only become fixed in a language if they can pass a threshold of frequency which
in the early stages they never have.”
A possible solution is a biased learning strategy: learners are biased to new variants which then
would have a chance to overcome the threshold. The bias can be social (e.g., status, number and
influence of users of the new variant) and functional (e.g., easier to acquire, produce, or interpret in
comparison to the old variant). Nettle (1999b) integrates such biased influences in his account by
implementing a version2 of Latané’s (1981) Social Impact Theory (SIT) in his model: the impact
of a variant is composed of i) the functional bias of the variant and ii) the social bias as a function
over the average status, the average social distance and the number of users of this variant. Nettle’s
simulations deal with a population of agents in different life-stages arranged on a grid, where spatial
distance corresponds to social distance and the grid structure incorporates familial and horizontal
social ties. In each simulation step, each agent has to choose between two linguistic items, an already
established variant and a new variant. Agents choose that item with the higher impact according to
SIT. Nettle wanted to expose to what extend specific circumstances in form of parameters promote
the new variant to overcome the threshold of frequency.
Nettle’s simulation results show that i) under extreme conditions like high parochialism or mu-
tation rate the new variant can be locally established, but never fan out over the whole society, ii)
under a ’social status distribution’ according to a Poisson curve3 and with also some hyperinfluential
agents, a new variant overtakes the whole society from time to time and iii) a higher functional bias
can a) make an old variant more resistant to be overtaken by a new one and in return b) facilitate
the new variant to replace the old one.4 All in all, the results specifically show that functional bias
alone fails to explain the changing nature of language. It is only in combination with social status
and influence that linguistic change may appear.5
Ke et al. (2008) challenge Nettle’s results in two aspects: i) they point out that the fact that his
model needs hyperinfluential agents to accomplish society-wide language change fails to explain a
phenomenon Labov (2001) calls changes from below: linguistic change that has emerged in lower
social classes; and ii) they regard Nettle’s regular population structure as unrealistic. Concerning
this matter Ke et al. use Nettle’s model and change the SIT function by dropping social status and
distance6 and using social network structures: small-world and scale-free networks. Their results
reveal that small-world networks, like regular networks, bring along a high success probability of a
society-wide spread of the new variant, but a slow diffusion rate; whereas scale-free networks, like
random networks, have a lower success probability, but a fast diffusion rate.
Finally, in a recent study, Fagyal et al. (2010a) use scale-free networks with directed connections
denoting the direction of influence. Furthermore they reconsider the possibility of more than two
different competing variants. An agent’s social status is defined by his influence, which is the number
of outgoing connections. Agents in the network can adopt a new variant of direct neighbors with
2This version was already used in simulations by Nowak et al. (1990), but not for linguistic issues, but for
public opinion formation.
3It can be shown that across all societies the distribution of wealth forms a Poisson curve (c.f. Wolff, 1998),
a curve that has a large cluster around the median and a long tail to the right, i.e., a society with few influential
and many averaged individuals.
4In other words: If we call a variant with a lower functional bias the marked one, then this result reveals a
tendency from marked to unmarked variants in language change.
5In another study, Nettle (1999a) uses his SIT simulation framework to support the following thesis: ”The
smaller the size of a language community, the higher the rate of linguistic change.” Here Nettle’s simulation
results not only support this thesis, but also reveal a promoting character of smaller communities for variants
with a low functional bias (unmarked variants), a tendency that is also empirically observable.
6In their model every agent has the same social status and is influenced only by directly connected agents.
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a probability proportional to the neighbors’ statuses. While their standard experiments result in a
process where variants spread, stabilize for a while, and are replaced by a new one from time to
time, in further experiments they showed that i) with the lack of peripheral agents the first stabilized
variant will never replaced by a new one, ii) with the lack of strongly influential agents there is no
society-wide propagation of any variant over time and iii) without agents’ consideration of social
status by choosing which variant to adopt, no variant spreads society-wide, but competing variants
diffuse in a chaotic way.
With these results Fagyal et al. show that two specific agents types (according to their position
in the network) have specific roles in the process of language change: the peripheral low-connected
agents preserves an old variant which at one point probably becomes a new candidate for propaga-
tion, and the central influential agent induces a propagation of a new variant. Furthermore the third
result shows that central and high-connected agents with a high status are powerful propagators of
new variants and stabilizers of spread ones. Fagyal et al. finally mention that their work brings
support to Nettle’s intuition: ”the key to diffusion is differential social selection.”
These studies revealed that not only is the functional bias of a linguistic variant essential in lan-
guage change, but the social environment plays an important role as well. This environment includes
variables like social status and influence (Nettle, 1999a,b), the structure of the social network (Ke
et al., 2008), or the presence/absence of specifically positioned agents (Fagyal et al., 2010a). From
a linguistic point of view, all of these studies analyze language change on a highly abstract and
general level, defined by the mechanism of a variant a replacing a variant b. Linguistic variants are
items dealt with like a cultural trait. These experiments can also explain the evolutionary processes
of other cultural traits like rules, norms, opinions, etc. 7 In other words, they abstract away from an
essential feature of language: to communicate - to convey information from a speaker to a recipient.
Essential reasons that discourage scientists from using simulations could include i) the combi-
natorial explosion of parameters an enriched simulation brings with it and ii) the lack of techniques
to model agent behavior in a more precise but realistic way. The first problem is one every researcher
working with simulations has to consider, being well-advised to keep the model based on as many
parameters as needed but as few parameters as possible. The second problem is where the promise
of game theory reveals itself, in particular when combined with dynamics of learning or rational
deliberation.
4 Game Theory and Linguistics
In recent years, the techniques of game theory have become a new research methodology for the
study of language use. The basic impetus for this consolidation is the following: a speaker’s ut-
terance itself is only effective if a recipient can arrive at an interpretation of it. Communication in
the sense of transmitting information works only in the case that the recipient arrives at the correct
interpretation of the utterance, i.e., the one the speaker intended to transmit. This approach has seen
particular success in modeling pragmatic phenomena as derivative from rational processes much in
the same way that semantic processes derive from logical ones (c.f. Benz et al., 2010). This attention
to the strategy inherent in communicative contexts has a parallel in game theory’s evolutionary side.
In other words, when we see conventionalized forms (often driven by social variables or commu-
nicative contexts), we are seeing variants displaying a kind of evolutionary stability. But how do
these conventions arise? One answer is through signaling.
To tackle the problem of conventions in society, Lewis (1969) invented signaling games. He
was searching for an answer to the question: ”How can linguistic meaning arise and become a
convention without prior agreements?” Sans prior agreements and considering that agreements need
language, we would come to a paradox: Language is needed for language to emerge. Lewis paved
a way for refuting this paradox by showing that with the model of a signaling game, conventional
linguistic meaning can arise without such agreements. A basic model can be informally described
7Effectively the Social Impact Theory used by Nettle (and in a trimmed form by Ke et al.) was formerly used
in simulations experiments for the spread of public opinions in a network (Nowak et al., 1990). Furthermore
even the model of Fagyal et al. was used similarly (Fagyal et al., 2010b) to analyze the spread of norms.
134 ROLAND MÜHLENBERND AND JASON QUINLEY
as follows: a signaling game is a game between a speaker S and a recipient R. The speaker S wants
to communicate a given state or topic t by sending a signal, or message, m to the recipient R. The
recipient has to choose an interpretation state, or action, a for the received message. If t corresponds
to a then communication was successful and both participants get a high payoff, if not, both get a
low (or zero) payoff. The way a speaker (recipient) behaves is called speaker (recipient) strategy.8
It is important to highlight a particularly feature of basic signaling games: each message m has
no predefined meaning. Lewis’ original question was how a message m acquires a meaning t, in
other words how speaker and recipient coordinate their strategies such that m is only sent in state
t and at the same time only construed by interpretation a appropriate to t. In the spirit of Lewis’
model, a linguistic convention is such a ’t −m− a’ mapping emerging as a population of agents
play the signaling game repeatedly. But for agents to coordinate their behavior, they have to update
their strategies, e.g., by reconsidering previous plays and adapt their behavior accordingly, which is
realized by a mechanism called update dynamics.
Lewis’s signaling games originally evolved in a framework of language evolution, but there
are reasons to assume that signaling games are also appropriate to model language change in a
sociolinguistic sense. First of all, each kind of actual language use can more generally be seen as a
convention. Furthermore language change (e.g., in form of old words are replaced with new words
in a speech community) can be seen as replacing an old convention with a new one. In this sense
signaling games show promise for understanding sociolinguistic processes. Furthermore when it
comes to using repeated games and update dynamics to model cultural evolution, the first models
combined signaling games with population-based evolutionary dynamics9 (c.f. Skyrms, 1996), but
following work takes a more agent-based view by using imitation dynamics (c.f. Zollman, 2005) or
learning dynamics (c.f. Argiento et al., 2009) and on top of that taking sociolinguistic variables like
social status and network positions into account, as we’ll show in Section 5.
5 Simulating Sociolinguistic Phenomena per Games on Networks
In the following we’ll present two studies recently elaborated by using techniques from network
theory and game theory in a simulation model. The first study deals with the emergence of lan-
guage conventions (Mühlenbernd and Franke, 2012), inspired by Milroy and Milroy’s (1985) study
of speaker innovation. In the second study we examine language change through social contact
(Quinley and Mühlenbernd, 2012), a class of phenomena related to Labov’s concepts of linguistic
diversity instigated by language contact and influenced by social status (c.f. Labov, 2007, 2010).
5.1 The Emergence of Language Conventions
Mühlenbernd and Franke (2012) analyzed how the emergence of language conventions depends on
the social structure of a population: ”This paper probes deeper into the relation between social struc-
ture and language evolution in order to further our knowledge of synthetic evolutionary processes in
structured populations and thereby to pave the way for a more thorough understanding of the socio-
logical factors of linguistic variability.” In this study agents are positioned on small-world networks
and their behavior is simulated by repeatedly communicating with direct neighbors by playing a
signaling game, as described in Section 4. In this model the simplest variant of a signaling game
is reconsidered, the so-called Lewis game: a signaling game with two information states t and t,
two messages m and m and two interpretation states a and a. For a Lewis game, there exist
two different strategy profiles that (i) ensure perfect communication, (ii) have specific properties of
stability in populations of agents10, and (iii) can be interpreted as semantic meaning. These two
strategy profiles are called signaling conventions, whose emergence process can be seen as prag-
matic evolution.
8See e.g., (Benz et al., 2010) for a short formal description.
9Here especially evolutionary game theory and therein the replicator dynamics plays a major role.
10E.g., it can be shown that exactly and only these two strategy profiles are evolutionary stable, a concept
from evolutionary game theory. For more details see e.g., Wärneryd (1993).
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A primary result of the simulation runs is that both signaling conventions spread over the whole
society, distributing the population in language regions.11 Interestingly, conventions can arise but
never stabilize only with one agent. They always start with one agent but stabilize in local groups,
sometimes permeating throughout the society. This resulting pattern corresponds to Eckert’s (Eck-
ert, 1989, 2000) ethnographic account of adolescent peer groups’ language use in Belten High that
reveals multiple small networks with at least one leader in each micro-community engaged in activ-
ities chiefly characterizing that group. Furthermore the diffusion process itself is in line with Milroy
and Milroy’s (1985) classification of speaker innovation, rated according to diffusion success in the
following way:
1. speaker innovation may fail to diffuse beyond the speaker
2. speaker innovation may diffuse only in the local community and go no further
3. speaker innovation may diffuse in the local community and then subsequently into other com-
munities via further innovators who has ties with both the relevant communities
The further tasks of Mühlenbernd and Franke’s study includes to analyze i) the connective properties
of language regions and ii) the node properties of agents characterized according to their role in the
emergence process of signaling conventions (all employed properties are described in Section 2.2).
First, the analysis of connective properties reveals that language regions have a higher clus-
tering and transitivity value than the whole network, with the density value not exhibiting such a
divergence. This result implies that a locally dense structure in form of cliquishness supports the
emergence and stability of local conventions and is in accord with Milroy and Margrain’s (1980) hy-
pothesis that ”closeness to vernacular speech norms correlates positively with the level of individual
integration into local community network”.
Second, the analysis of the node properties of agents shows that conventions i) initially emerge
by a small number of locally embedded and highly influential agents (high values of individual
clustering and degree centrality), called founding fathers; ii) spread fast among locally embedded
non-central agents (high individual clustering and low centrality values), called stabilizers; and iii)
are late adopted by globally central agents (low individual clustering and high centrality values),
called late learners that are predominantly positioned between different language regions.
The role and properties of founding fathers are in accord with results of Fagyal et al. (2010a),
who found that ”charismatic leaders with strong ties to the local community have also been identified
as innovators... The near-equivalents of such central figures in other studies (Labov, 2001; Mendoza-
Denton, 2008) led to the proposal that leaders of language change are centrally-connected, highly
visible individuals whose influence can extend beyond their own personal networks.”. Furthermore,
the role of stabilizers enables a fast spread of a (new) convention that would give them the impulsive
role in linguistic change. This corresponds to Labov (1994), who postulates that language change
emerges when other speakers start adopting and using innovations conventionally; or as Wolfram
and Schilling-Estes (2003) pointed out: ”it is not the act of innovation that changes language, but
the act of influence that instantiates it.”
This study illustrates one possibility of applying a game-theoretic model of agent behavior
simulated on a social network for the purpose of analyzing a sociolinguistic phenomenon. The
analysis deals with forces of language change in general rather than with a particular phenomenon.
With the next section we present a similar approach but for a slightly more specific case.
5.2 Language Change through Social Contact
There is a central problem in historical linguistics: time travel has yet to be invented. Nonetheless,
the field persists onward through meticulous and intrepid attention to data that are increasingly
harder to find. Here is where simulations enter the picture. Although they can never tell us exactly
what happened, they can certainly tell us what could not have occurred.
11A maximal subset of agents forming a connected subgraph that have acquired the same convention
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The matter in question is the Norman invasion of 1066 and its irrevocable impact on the English
lexicon. The salient division of meaning space seen now follows a predictable trend: prestige tends
toward the items of French origin, and the commonplace has its home with the Germanic words. The
theory is that the social conditions of the Anglo-Saxon workers and their French-speaking Norman
overlords caused this divergence, but could the results have been different?
The results from Quinley and Mühlenbernd (2012) give us an answer. Here agents placed on a
scale-free network played a two-state, single-message signaling game augmented with contexts. A
status variable governed the distribution of these contexts, and in the beginning of each trial each
agent knew only one message, requiring a context to probabilistically disambiguate the speaker’s
meaning. Agents were replaced in part by invaders having identical topics and contexts but with a
new message, and these invading agents introduced their variant while at the same time acquiring
the native variant. These two messages emancipated the agents from context dependence in every
trial, producing a robust signaling system holding throughout the network.
The what–ifs of history were then addressed by starting simulation trials with different settings.
Trial 1 replaced agents with invaders randomly along the social ladder, and it found that half of
the simulation runs ended with the expected convention, the other half ended with the opposite
conventions of the aforementioned patterns seen in Modern English. To put this is context, this
showed that had the Norman invaders replaced the Anglo-Saxons at random, the marked prestige of
so many French borrowings in English would not be the case as it is today.12
Trials 2 and 3 took the social variables into account. Trial 2 replaced only those agents above a
certain status threshold, and it showed that as this threshold increased, so would the probability of
the conventions we see today. Trial 3 took this a step further by tying status and structure together:
invaders replace agents with not only a high status, but also a high degree of centrality in the network.
As mentioned above, both the degree distribution in a scale-free network and the wealth distribution
in many societies follow a Poisson curve. This gives us a way to interpret the links in a network as
those influenced by our business dealings. By linking the degree of an agent to his status, the study
found an even sharper convergence towards the expected convention.
The curious thing not mentioned in the original study was that the mechanisms of context dis-
tribution and targeted replacement of agents also has another unique predictive property: it predicts
the ”change from the bottom” seen in (Labov, 2001). This study may also be a way to sharpen a
view of the competition going on between various speakers and the grammars to which they adhere.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
In section 2 we made the case for understanding network structures as a means to explain linguistic
variation and change. Here we emphasized the empirical point of view that would later motivate the
work done in simulations. In section 3 we gave some examples of computer simulations modeling
the emergence of society-wide linguistic phenomena across a panoply of social structures. The
crux of many of the experiments carried out up to now (e.g., Nettle, 1999a,b) has been the view of
linguistic variants as cultural traits. As such experiments can also explain the evolutionary processes
of other cultural traits like rules, norms, and opinions, they crucially abstract away from an essential
feature of language: to communicate - to convey information from a sender to a receiver. At this
point, game theory comes into play: here we can model a situation between two agents with the goal
to communicate successfully. The most prominent version of such a game is the signaling game,
which we claim has applications beyond pragmatics. Agent-based simulations of signaling games
on networks represent a powerful combination of tools that hitherto were used in isolation. Much
more, as a virtual laboratory environment they bring a crucial supplement to any linguist interested
in the impact social variables have on the dynamics of language variation and change.
12The canonical example used is swine vs. pork.
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